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SIX OPINIONS BY MR. JUSTICE STEVENS: A NEW
METHODOLOGY FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CASES?
ROBERT F. NAGEL*

INTRODUCTION

While the doctrinal formulations so characteristic of modern
American constitutional law remain in use, their power and primacy
seem to be on the wane. Some justices seek to supplement standard

formulaic opinion writing with common law minimalism, some with
policy analysis, and some with categorical rules. Issues as disparate as

discrimination against gays and congressional power to enforce the
Free Exercise Clause are resolved by blunt references to illicit

motivation rather than by announced doctrine.' Where the old three
and four-part "tests" are still fully in use, there is a discernable lack of
conviction. The fearsome "strict scrutiny" test is now applied in
affirmative action cases, as well as in some free speech cases, in a way
that does not lead to invalidation of the challenged law.2 On the
other hand, the supposedly deferential "rational basis test" rather
frequently does lead to invalidation-but not for reasons that have
any necessary connection to irrationality.3 In one notable instance

involving discrimination against aliens in the public schools, the
elaborately crafted distinctions that make up the three tiers of equal
protection "scrutiny" literally collapsed into a formless jumble.4 In

* Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr., Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Colorado School
of Law. The author acknowledges helpful comments from Richard Collins, Allison Eid, and
Steven D. Smith.
1. City of Boerne v. P. F. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 509 (1997) (enforcement of Free Exercise
Clause); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (discrimination against homosexuals).
2. E.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (emphasizing that
application of strict scrutiny does not necessarily lead to invalidation); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 29 (1976) (upholding campaign contributions limitations under "rigorous" free speech
standard of review).
3. E.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 632 (1996) (public animosity as basis for invalidation); U.S.
Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (desire to harm a politically unpopular
group impermissible).
4. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223-24 (1982) (asserting that a statute cannot be considered
rational unless it furthers "some substantial goal of the State").
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short, the heart seems to be going out of an intellectual enterprise
that dominated modern American constitutional law for many years.
A few years ago I tentatively suggested that this decline might reflect a generalized loss of confidence in the possibility of achieving
programmatic reform, at least while maintaining a distinctively legal
voice. 5 Even more tentatively I suggested that because the urge to
use courts to implement social reform had not vanished and legal
formalism had not regained intellectual ascendancy, we could expect
to see intensifying efforts to fashion new modes of judicial discourse
that might serve the purposes once served by doctrinal discourse.
Based on early indications in the Court's decisions and also (I should
admit) on my doggedly pessimistic nature, I guessed that the results
might be even more unattractive than the misleading, overbearing
language of calibrated doctrine.
The purpose of this Essay is to test this prediction on a very
modest scale by examining several recent opinions written by Justice
John Paul Stevens. For a number of reasons, Stevens' work may well
be indicative of underlying trends. He is, as these six opinions
demonstrate, a justice who exhibits considerable self-confidence, both
about his views of proper public policy and about using judicial
power. For the most part, however, Stevens does not attempt to
achieve his vision for the future by virtuoso doctrinal performances.
On the contrary, his opinions have long displayed an invigorating (if
sometimes eccentric) willingness to rethink and, some would say, to
disregard established doctrinal formulations. 6 In contrast to some
others, such as Justices Scalia or O'Connor, who also appear dissatisfied with doctrinalism, Stevens has not tried to return to any traditionally legalistic modes of explanation. Nevertheless, Justice Stevens
has not given up on the need for a distinctively legal role and voice;
indeed, he emphatically denies that judging should involve the
imposition of a "personal point of view" and thinks that judicial
speech-even during election campaigns-should be different from
5. Richard Fallon et al., Will the Brennan Legacy Endure?, 43 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 177,
181-86 (1999) (Nagel-authored section of article). This speculation was an extension of my
earlier assessment of the nature and function of formal constitutional doctrine. ROBERT F.
NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL

REVIEW ch. 7 ("The Formulaic Constitution") (1989).
6. An early and consistent example of Stevens' iconoclasm has been his skepticism about
the Court's standard position on content discrimination. See Steven J. Heyman, Spheres of
Autonomy: Reforming the Content Neutrality Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 10
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 647, 650 n.17 (2002); Note, Content Regulation and the Dimensions
of Free Expression, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1854, 1855 nn.8-10 (1983).
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ordinary political speech.7 Stevens, in short, is a man in acute need of
a new way to write constitutional decisions. He needs a way to
express an ambitious moral agenda in terms that convey the impersonal authority of fundamental law. To do this, of course, he has to
draw upon the rhetorical resources available in the general culture,
but he also must use these resources in a way that alters and elevates
them.
If Justice Stevens succeeds in this audacious endeavor, he may
chart an innovative and attractive course for constitutional discourse
in this new century. If not, his opinions may only provide further
evidence that what constitutional doctrinalism sought to combine
cannot be combined. 8 I begin with an opinion where both the potential benefits and risks of Stevens' enterprise are on display.
I.

ACCOMMODATION FOR THE UNWILLING LISTENER: HILL V.
COLORADO 9

Although criticized as an instance of specialized jurisprudence
reserved for abortion issues, Justice Stevens' opinion validating
Colorado's so-called "bubble law" is an intriguing indicator of the
general direction of his emerging constitutional methodology. His
analysis begins by defining the issue as being "whether the Colorado
statute reflects an acceptable balance between the constitutionally
protected rights of law-abiding speakers and the interests of unwilling
listeners. .... "10 The phrase "acceptable balance," while slightly

redolent of some existing judicial tests, in fact signals Stevens' dissatisfaction with layered, ostensibly precise doctrines. His substitute
formulation is more vague and more forthrightly subjective. He
proceeds to identify in concrete, candid terms the interests to be
balanced. On one side of the balance, he concedes that the statute
regulates leafleting, signs, and oral communications that are clearly
protected by the First Amendment even if offensive and, indeed, that
it regulates those activities in public places that are "'quintessential'
public forums for free speech."" On the other side of the balance is
the state's legitimate interest in "the avoidance of potential trauma to
patients [seeking to use heath care facilities] associated with confron7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 797 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See NAGEL, supra note 5, at 121-55.
530 U.S. 703 (2000).
Id. at 714.
Id. at 715.
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tational protests.",, Stevens goes on to depict this interest more
abstractly as the "unwilling listener's interest in avoiding unwanted
communication" and, using the words of Justice Brandeis, he lionizes
this "right to be let alone" as "the right most valued by civilized
men."

13

The Stevens opinion, having defined the terms of analysis in general, extradoctrinal terms, proceeds for many pages to discuss conventional free speech doctrines. The length and detail of this discussion
might seem to mean that Stevens is capitulating to formulaic analysis.
Except superficially, however, this impression is wrong; the discussion
is aimed, not at applying free speech doctrine, but at escaping it.
Indeed, at virtually every turn, Stevens finds that existing formulations do not apply at all or apply only loosely. For instance, despite
the fact that the statute applies to oral communications made "for the
purpose of... engaging in... protest, education, or counseling,"' 14
Stevens insists that it involves neither content discrimination nor
viewpoint discrimination.15 And he finds that it is not "overbroad."16
And that it is not void for vagueness. 7 And that it does not create a
"heckler's veto. 1' 8 Indeed, Stevens eventually concludes that the
statute's requirement that unwanted communications be kept at an
eight foot distance is not in fact a restriction of speech at all-it is
only a restriction of "the places where some speech may occur."' 19
Accordingly, Stevens concludes that the relevant tests are those
that are applicable to content-neutral "time, place, and manner"
regulations. 0 Hence, says Stevens, the statute must be "narrowly
tailored" to serve legitimate interests.21 At this point in the opinion,
having located the doctrine that does apply, it might seem that
Stevens must become embroiled in applying conventional doctrine.
But no, in application, the relevant doctrine simply recedes from
view. Stevens asserts, for example, that in determining whether the
restrictions impose more burdens on speech than necessary, the Court
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

716-17.
720.
720-23.
730-32.
732-33.
734.
719, 731.
725.
726.
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"must accord a measure of deference to the judgment of the Colorado legislature. '22 Moreover, after acknowledging that the statute
restricts some who would not threaten the physical or emotional
welfare of patients, Stevens defers to the decision of the state legisla21 3
ture to take "a prophylactic approach.
It is possible, of course, to deny that in all this Justice Stevens is
unburdening his explanations from the weight of formulaic rules. It
may be that he is conscientiously applying those rules and finding
them satisfied. The dissents vigorously deny this possibility, and it is
difficult not to agree with them. Consider the central element in the
Stevens opinion: the
high valuation accorded the interests of the
"unwilling listener. '24 Although Stevens argues that this valuation is
consistent with precedent, Justice Scalia makes a strong case that this
aspect of Stevens' analysis must be understood as a rather significant
departure. It is not, he argues, the interest that the state claimed
was served by the statute.2 6 And it is not precisely the interest extolled by Justice Brandeis, because that interest had to do with
27
insulation from the government, not insulation from public debate.
And, most fundamentally, Scalia argues it is not consistent with the
general, well-entrenched principle that in public areas, citizens must
be willing to put up with unwanted, even offensive, messages.2 8
Moreover, even on the assumption that the received doctrine permits
the Court to give great weight to the interest in protecting unwilling
listeners on public sidewalks, Scalia says that the Court should have
employed the "strict scrutiny" test because the bubble law made
content discriminations and, in any event, because established doctrine does not permit judicial deference to legislative judgments about
the range of speech regulated and the need for prophylactic restrictions. 29
Assuming Justice Scalia is right about all this, he is not necessarily right to characterize Stevens' analysis as a specialized approach
designed only for the abortion context. A more radical possibility is
that the terms and operations of the formulae relied on in Scalia's
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 727.
Id. at 729.
Id. at 716-17.
Id. at 751-52 (Scalia,
Id. at 749-50 (Scalia,
Id. at 751-52 (Scalia,
Id. at 750-52 (Scalia,
Id. at 759-61 (Scalia,

J., dissenting).
J., dissenting).
J.,
dissenting).
J., dissenting).
J., dissenting).
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critique are morally and institutionally unattractive and that Stevens'
opinion in Hill is a part of a systematic reaction against them. Or, to
put the matter affirmatively, perhaps Justice Stevens is developing
new terms and new methods for resolving free speech cases. Precisely
to the extent that his opinion in Hill is profoundly unpersuasive in
traditional doctrinal terms, Stevens can be seen as taking one step in a
potentially radical effort to escape the unrealistic and misleading
terms of conventional free speech discourse.
At least traces of a potentially attractive reconceptualization of
free speech discourse can be seen underlying Stevens' opinion. Think
again about his depiction of the state's interest. While the protection
of the feelings of unwilling listeners may not have been the interest
asserted by the state, it was plainly and undeniably the major interest
served by the law. The state distorted the statement of its interests
for strategic reasons because, under standard First Amendment
doctrine, protection against offensiveness is a deeply suspect objective. Stevens' departure from the usual practice of working from the
state's articulation of its own interest injected into his analysis a
degree of realism that conventional free speech doctrine discourages
and made it possible for the justices to think about an issue that
conventional doctrine treats rather dogmatically.
Of course, it is usually thought that there are solid reasons for
shutting off thought about states' interests in regulating against
offensiveness. It is said that protection from offensiveness is a
boundless justification that, if accepted, could lead to the general
suppression of speech.30 And it is said that in most circumstances
listeners can avoid the harm from offensive speech by leaving or
looking away. 31 These claims, formalized and ossified in the doctrine,
are overdue for reconsideration. After all, the fact that a justification
theoretically can often be asserted does not mean that it will be. The
real danger posed to free speech interests depends on complex social
and psychological factors that go far beyond the nature of the justification offered, and Stevens' position might make room for a more
wide-ranging and sophisticated consideration of the actual risks to
free speech interests. Moreover, it defies everyday experience to
believe that an unwilling listener's psychic interests are necessarily
slight because the offensive message can be avoided. Averting eyes
or walking away does not, of course, remove either the image or the
30. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22-25 (1971).
31. Id. at 21.
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memory of an unwanted message. It may be that for some reason
protection against shock, dismay, disgust, fear, and disorientation is
always less important than the free speech interest involved, but the
argument for this conclusion is not advanced by systematically
pretending that the state's interest is less significant than it is. In
short, Stevens' bold and sympathetic recognition of the range of
interests actually protected by the bubble law could be a step toward
a more thoughtful and realistic methodology in free speech cases.
Much the same, I think, can be said of every component of Stevens' doctrinal analysis-the conclusion that the bubble law is not a
restriction on speech but only of where speech takes place; the lack of
concern about content discrimination (including the legislature's
viewpoint-specific motivation); the relative insignificance attached to
the status of sidewalks as public forums; and the willingness to defer
to political judgments. Taken together, these positions are not so
much an application of free speech doctrine as they are an effort to
escape from its assumptions and limitations. They could constitute
part of a significant rethinking of the form and substance of free
speech law. Aside from its intellectual audacity, what is attractive
about this departure is that potentially it allows for greater realism
and subtlety in judicial analysis, more variety and gradations in the
local speech regulations, and a more appropriate distribution of
decision-making authority. It also opens up the possibility that the
law of free speech might be formulated and explained in ways that
more closely track common experience and widespread understandings.
At its most attractive, Stevens' analysis appears to draw on the
optimistic American instinct for tolerance and practicality. 32 His
opinion depicts both sides in the dispute sympathetically-on the one
side, he depicts law-abiding protestors exercising their undoubted
rights and, on the other, vulnerable patients seeking to exercise theirs.
There is, his overall approach suggests, no need to minimize or
choose between these interests. As profoundly antagonistic as the
parties may appear to be, the American ethic of civic tolerance can
benignly embrace them both. The patients can proceed relatively
undisturbed in their journey toward what the protestors regard as
murder, while the protestors can get their message across from a
32. For a recent treatment of this set of instincts, with special emphasis on nonjudgmentalism, see ALAN WOLFE, MORAL FREEDOM: THE IMPOSSIBLE IDEA THAT DEFINES THE WAY
WE LIVE Now (2001).
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distance of eight feet or from the many other sites that our rich
political life provides. Miles from the abstract and unrelenting
principles of most free speech jurisprudence, this opinion indicates
that there is no need to reject anyone's vital interests or to exaggerate
the stakes. All interests can be accommodated, and even the most
intractable disputes can be conducted in ways that do not threaten
important sensitivities, let alone our political community.
There are also unattractive aspects to Stevens' separation from
standard formulaic analysis. No matter how refreshing intellectually,
Stevens' adventurism creates inconsistency and unpredictability, and
probably threatens authoritativeness. All that, however, might be
worthwhile if Hill v. Colorado were one step in a profound reinvigoration of free speech discourse. But there are some disquieting
indications in Hill about what Stevens may be substituting for conventional doctrinal analysis. Rather than bringing judicial rhetoric and
values closer to the best in our political culture, his opinion may be
drawing on some of the worst.
That, in any event, is the implication of the charges made in Justice Scalia's and Justice Kennedy's extraordinary dissents. Scalia goes
so far as to charge that the majority opinion nullifies established law
in order to favor one side in the abortion debate.3 3 Justice Kennedy
accuses the majority of "turn[ing] its back"-of "strik[ing] at the
heart"-of the settled principle that, while abortion opponents could
not effectively voice their views in the legislative area, they were free
to engage in effective, individualized moral persuasion.3 4 Put more
abstractly, the overall critique is that the apparent nonjudgmentalism
of the Stevens opinion is a fraud-its concern for the feelings of the
parties is asymmetrical and masks the moral dimension of both the
abortion controversy and the Court's own opinion. Taken cumulatively, the dissenters' accusations come close to characterizing the
Stevens opinion as intentionally dishonest, politically opportunistic,
cruelly suppressive, and morally hypocritical. These, it must be said,
are elements in the American political culture no less than benevo3
lently tolerant pragmatism.

33. Hill, 530 U.S. at 741.
34. Id. at 791 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
35. On dishonesty, see WOLFE, supra note 32 at 100; see also MURRAY

EDELMAN,

THE

POLITICS OF MISINFORMATION (2001); CARL HAUSMAN, LIES WE LIVE BY: DEFEATING
DOUBLE-TALK AND DECEPTION IN ADVERTISING, POLITICS, AND THE MEDIA (2000). On the
hypocrisy of moral discourse, see ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN
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In sum, the Stevens opinion in Hill v. Colorado appears to be a
step in the process of grounding constitutional discourse more directly in the vocabulary of ordinary political life. It can be characterized as drawing on either the best or the worst of that vocabulary.
Deciding which of these competing characterizations is more accurate
will help determine whether Stevens' audacious assault on conventional doctrinal analysis is hopeful or dangerous. One way to begin to
make this assessment is to put Hill in the context of other opinions
authored by Justice Stevens.
II. PRIVACY SUBORDINATED
A.

36
City of Chicago v. Morales

In City of Chicago v. Morales, decided a year before Hill, Justice

Stevens authored an opinion invalidating an antiloitering ordinance
aimed at gang members. In Morales, Stevens identifies the city's
purpose as protecting the public-who were "afraid even to leave
their homes"-from the "presence of a large collection of obviously
brazen, insistent, and lawless gang members and hangers-on on the
37 Now, plainly, this interest in walking the streets
public ways ....
without feeling vulnerable or besieged is remarkably similar to the
interest of women seeking to work their way past intimidating crowds
into an abortion clinic, and, if anything, is even more stark. Nevertheless, while Stevens, of course, acknowledges that the purpose is
legitimate, 8 he does not employ the elevated terms that he would
later utilize in Hill. In Morales there are no references to Justice
'39
Brandeis and no talk of "the right most valued by civilized men.
Indeed, what engages Justice Stevens' sympathies is not the right to
be left alone, but instead the competing interest in what he calls the
constitutional right to loiter-"an individual's decision to remain in a
public place of his choice" or (quoting Blackstone) the right to move
'4
"to whatsoever place one's own inclination may direct."

MORAL THEORY (2d ed. 1984). On cultural conflict and the urge to suppress, see JAMES
DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA (1991).

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

527 U.S. 41 (1999).
Id. at 51.
Id. at 51-52
Compare Hill,530 U.S. at 717.
Morales, 527 U.S. at 54.
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It is possible that this difference in emphasis can be explained
and justified, perhaps on the ground that Stevens fully concedes that
the city can protect the right of citizens to walk the streets without
intimidation if it uses more specific language.41 The Colorado bubble
law at issue in Hill, however, could have been written in more precise
terms and still have achieved many of its purposes, if not its general
prophylactic objective. 41 Moreover, one might have expected a less
exacting demand for precision in Morales inasmuch as the interest
competing with privacy there is not, as Stevens concedes, freedom of
speech.43 Nevertheless, he examines the terms of the antiloitering
ordinance with a flinty eye, noting, for example, that when ordered to
disperse and leave the area, loiterers would have to decide how far to
move and how long to remain apart." Even assuming that Justice
Stevens is correct that the antiloitering ordinance was unconstitutionally vague while the bubble law later approved in Hill is not, it is
impossible to miss the distinct shift in tone and empathy. In Hill, for
instance, Stevens swiftly dismisses as a "hypertechnical" theory the
argument that a protestor might not know whether an outstretched
arm constituted "approaching" within the meaning of the law. 45
The obvious, if cynical, explanation for Stevens' relative disinterest in the right to be let alone in Morales is that the issue of abortion
was absent. Recall the charge of the dissenters in Hill that the deck
was "stacked" in that case, that their solicitude for the interests of the
unwilling listeners protected by the bubble law was one of "many
aggressively proabortion novelties announced by the Court ..."46
Even if this charge is accurate, the treatment of privacy in Morales
remains puzzling. After all, those who remained in their homes for
fear of gang intimidation presumably included some who were
foregoing activities of which Justice Stevens would heartily approve,
including, perhaps, trips to the local library or city council meeting or,
for that matter, to abortion counselors. This raises the question: Why
would Justice Stevens' moral sensibility be fully engaged by those
intimidated in a setting involving only particularized activities while
less engaged by those intimidated in a setting that could involve
virtually any activity and purpose?
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 51-52.
Hill, 530 U.S. at 727-29.
Morales, 527 U.S. at 52-53.
Id. at 59.
Hill, 530 U.S. at 733.
Id.at 764 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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At one level, a moral preference for the particularized setting
seems entirely perverse. Almost by definition, the greater the range
of activities foregone because of street intimidation, the more offensive the intimidation would seem to be. Or, to put it another way, the
greater the range of activities foregone and the wider the range of
people inhibited, the more certain one can be that the intimidation is
harming sensitive people engaged in valuable activities. Stating this
argument in this way suggests what might be at work, beyond ideological predisposition, in the differing sensibilities displayed in
Morales and in Hill. To appreciate the concrete kinds of harm
created in the more general setting would have required a higher
level of imaginative effort. In Morales, it would have been necessary
to imagine the various types of people, including the infirm or the
timid, affected by gang loitering, and it would have been necessary to
imagine in concrete, empathetic terms the range of activities inhibited. In Hill the specificity of the setting does much of this work. It is
a short step, indeed, to connect, as the Court does, abortion services
with young, "vulnerable" women who "may be under special physical
or emotional stress .... ,47 A preference for the immediate, the
concrete, and the personal is, needless to say, common. It is the basis
for much of the sentimentality that passes for moral judgment in
modern American entertainment. 48 It is disquieting, to say the least,
to think that Justice Stevens' bracing dissatisfaction with formulaic
decision making may be only a prelude to injecting that thin moral
sensibility into constitutional interpretation.
B.

49
Watchtower Bible and Tract Society v. Village of Stratton

Perhaps because it was decided well after Hill, many of the impulses evident in Hill can also be seen in Watchtower Bible and Tract
Society v. Village of Stratton, in which the Court, again speaking

through Justice Stevens, struck down an ordinance that required the
registration of door-to-door solicitors. Even more definitively than in
Hill, Stevens rejects the need to apply standard free speech doctrine,
stating that "[w]e find it unnecessary [to decide what standard of
review to apply] because the breadth of speech affected ...and the
47. Id. at 729.
48. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, And Prime Time for All, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 5 & 12, 2002, at
25-29 (noting society's preference for familiar, personalized events over the mostly nondramatic
reality of the law).
49. 536 U.S. 150 (2002).
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nature of the regulation make it clear that the Court of Appeals erred
in upholding it." 0 Moreover, as in Hill, he forthrightly acknowledges
the importance of the interests on both sides of the controversy and
defines the relevant inquiry in generalized, commonsensical terms:
"We must also look.., to the amount of speech covered by the
ordinance and whether there is an appropriate balance between the
affected speech and the governmental interests .... " 51
On a more fundamental level, Stevens appears once again to
draw on the pragmatic nonjudgmental strain in American political
life. Everyone's interest can be protected: the solicitors' free speech
interests require that the registration requirement not cover such a
broad range of speakers, while the homeowners' interest in privacy
can be adequately protected by rules enforcing individual "No
Solicitation" signs.52 No need for standards of review, calibrated
weighing, and so on; a sensible, tolerant people can work out a
53
solution.
However, in certain other respects, Hill and Watchtower Bible
are strikingly different. Even more so than in Morales, in Watchtower
Bible, Stevens is mechanical and unimaginative in his treatment of the
right to be let alone. After asserting that "'No Solicitation' signs"
provide "ample protection" for unwilling listeners within their homes,
Stevens writes that for those without such signs, "[t]he annoyance
caused by an uninvited knock on the front door is the same whether
or not the visitor is armed with a permit. 5 4 Perhaps the rather cold
word "annoyance" is justified in this context, but it is at least possible
that for some of those unwilling to post a sign preventing all solicitation there is nevertheless a sense of vulnerability or anxiety that
would be alleviated by public registration. And on the question of
whether any such enhanced sense of security would in fact be justified
by the deterrent effect of the registration rule, a reader of Hill might
have expected some sign of deference to local authorities.
Stevens' assessment of the significance of the burden of the registration requirement on free speech interests is as imaginative as his
assessment of the privacy interest is limited. He worries, for example,
about the inhibiting effects on the spontaneous speaker, who wishes
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

164.
165.
175-76.
168-69.
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to go door-to-door when the registration office is closed, and even
about the principled speaker, whose "religious scruples" might
prevent her from registering even if a permit is assured.5 What, one
inevitably wonders, about the spontaneous anti-abortion protestor
whose sense of urgency suddenly impels her across the eight-foot
line? Or the principled protestor who would rather stay silent than
have the details of her demonstration regulated by the state legislature? Or to put the matter in less quibbling terms, if an eight-foot
"bubble" is not a restriction on speech at all-if it is, merely, as
Stevens asserts in Hill, a regulation of where and when speech can
occur-surely a registration requirement that any speaker can satisfy
is not a significant restraint on speech either. But it is, writes Justice
Stevens, who goes so far as to assert that such a restriction "constitutes a dramatic departure from our national heritage and constitutional tradition. 56 Indeed, the ordinance is offensive "not only to the
values protected by the First Amendment, but to the very notion of a
free society.. . -"I So much, the cynic might say, for the Court's brief

liberation from dogma and exaggeration.
The apparent inconsistencies between Hill and Watchtower Bible
might or might not in the end be defensible, but they certainly highlight disturbing signs of a degenerative discourse. Stevens' description of the interests of solicitors is personalized, somewhat
sentimental, and exaggerated. When combined with his disinterest in
the variety of anxieties and concerns that homeowners might have,
his opinion verges once again toward melodrama, an impression only
confirmed by Stevens' vainglorious depiction of the Court as protector of "the little people. '5 8
C. Bartnicki v. Vopper 9

A year after Hill, Stevens, writing for the Court in Bartnicki v.
Vopper, again weighed freedom of speech against the right to be left
alone. At issue was the extension of federal and state wiretap acts to
"the repeated intentional disclosure of an illegally intercepted cellular
telephone conversation about a public issue" when the broadcaster

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id. at 166.
Id. at 165-66.
Id. at 163 (quoting Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943)).
532 U.S. 514 (2001).
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had not participated in the illegal interception. 6° As in Hill, Stevens
begins by depicting the issue as a "conflict between interests of the
highest order-on the one hand, the interest in the full and free
dissemination of information concerning public issues, and, on the
other hand, the interest in individual privacy .. "61 The privacy
interest in Bartnicki, obviously, is not precisely the same as that
involved in protecting the sensitivities of unwilling listeners, but, as
Stevens himself emphasizes, it does involve insulating the individual
from public exposure and embarrassment. 62 Thus, as is true of laws
protecting unwilling listeners, wiretap acts protect against a sense of
personal vulnerability and unwanted visibility.
Nevertheless, in striking contrast to Hill, in Bartnicki, Stevens resolves the conflict between speech and privacy through standard free
speech methodology. While Hill is notable for the degree of deference given the legislature on how best to protect the sensibilities of
unwilling listeners, Bartnicki is conventional in its unapologetic
refusal to defer to Congress and some forty state legislatures on the
question of whether imposing liability on third-party publishers would
deter eavesdropping by "drying up the market. '63 More generally, in
Bartnicki, Justice Stevens relies uncritically on existing First Amendment doctrines. Referring to formulations initiated in New York
Times v. Sullivan64 and developed in various cases, he asserts that
"parallel reasoning requires the conclusion that a stranger's illegal
conduct does not suffice to remove the First Amendment shield from
'65
speech about a matter of public concern.
Whatever else this decision may mean, then, Bartnicki represents
the resurgence in Stevens' thinking of conventional civil libertarian
beliefs about the primacy of free speech values, the very dogmas so
energetically resisted in Hill. Abortion, no less than the information
about a public collective bargaining process that was broadcast by the
defendants in Bartnicki, is a matter of public concern. At least, issues
of the sort presumably raised by the protestors who were prosecuted
under the bubble law at issue in Hill-such as whether abortion is
murder and what personal interests might or might not justify it-are

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 517.
Id. at 518.
Id. at 526, 532-33.
Id. at 550.
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 535.
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discussed in opinions of the United States Supreme Court and
debated in Congress. It is true that open discussion of such public
issues, when directed at an individual entering a medical clinic, also
intrudes upon feelings and relationships that are intimate and personal. But that is true, as well, of open discussion of the content of an
intercepted telephone conversation.
That Stevens should in an occasional case abandon his doubts
about conventional free speech doctrine does not necessarily say
much about the quality of whatever new methodology he may-with
some hesitation-be developing. However, in one respect the conventionality of Bartnicki does raise doubts about the nature of
Stevens' broader contribution. To the extent that he retains constitutional formulae when their application easily leads to desired outcomes, the suspicion arises that his new methodologies are
opportunistic rather than iconoclastic. This possibility, like some
others canvassed in this Essay, would root Stevens' constitutional
discourse in some of the shabbier aspects of American culture.
Certainly the view that argumentation is often an insincere device for
engineering agreement can be seen in popular cynicism towards
political debate. This cynicism is fortified by the influence of important intellectual movements offering rarified justifications for the
66
notion that political and moral discourse is inevitably manipulative.
To the extent that Stevens' constitutional iconoclasm turns out to be
episodic, there is at least indirect confirmation of the charge, already
fiercely made by Justice Scalia, 67 that the substantive argumentation
in his opinions is only strategic.
D. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale68
On the same day that the Court issued the Hill decision, it also
issued another First Amendment decision, Boy Scouts of America v.
Dale, in which Justice Stevens wrote a bitter dissenting opinion. In

66. For a critical account of postmodernistism, see KEITH WINDSCHUTrLE, THE KILLING
OF HISTORY: How LITERARY CRITICS AND SOCIAL THEORISTS ARE MURDERING OUR PAST

(1996).
67. Commenting on Justice Stevens' argument that the execution of the mentally retarded
violates a "national consensus," Justice Scalia wrote: "The arrogance of this assumption of
power takes one's breath away. And it explains, of course, why the Court can be so cavalier
about the evidence of consensus. It is just a game, after all.... [It is the feelings and intuition
of a majority of the Justices that count ....
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 348 (2002) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
68. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
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some ways, his dissent is consistent with his position in Hill. In both
instances he favored subordinating free speech rights to other interests. In Dale, that other interest was not the protection of unwilling
listeners, but the reduction of discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. Stevens argued that requiring the Boy Scouts to employ
Dale, an avowed homosexual, as an assistant scoutmaster did not
force that organization "to communicate any message that its does
not wish to endorse. '69 Since the Boy Scouts organization claimed
repeatedly and urgently during litigation that it did not wish to
communicate the various messages that might be thought implicit in
keeping a homosexual in a position of leadership,70 Stevens' claim to
the contrary is rather bold. Examining its rules and pronouncements
prior to litigation, Stevens in effect presumed to know what the Boy
Scouts intended to say better than the Boy Scouts organization itself.
Given the sympathetic treatment Stevens gave the right to be left
alone in Hill, it is striking that in Dale he went to such lengths to
decide whether association with an avowed homosexual conflicted
with the Boy Scouts' message. Indeed, it is peculiar that Stevens
should have conceptualized the main issue as involving "speaking" at
all. It was of no concern in Hill whether the would-be patient was
"saying" anything in declining the importuning of the protestors; the
relevant interest was that the patients did not want to associate with
the protestors, not whether listening to the protestors would actually
contradict any message the patient intended to convey. Even in the
cases where under Stevens' analysis a privacy interest did not prevail,
he at least formally recognized the existence of that interest independently of the content of any message communicated. For instance, a homeowner's decision to close the door in the face of a
solicitor protects the legitimate interest in the privacy of the home
without any inquiry into whether associating with the solicitor would
actually conflict with anything the homeowner stood for or wanted to
say. The patient and the homeowner can both cut off continued
association because otherwise they might be subject to unwanted
feelings of vulnerability, embarrassment, or exposure, not because of
any message they might want to convey.
It might seem perverse for me to compare, as I just did, the Boy
Scout organization with patients on the way to an abortion clinic and
a would-be Scout leader with those persistent, importuning anti69. Id. at 665.
70. Id. at 651-52.
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abortion protestors. But the simple fact is that the Boy Scout organization wished to cut off an uncomfortable association while Dale
insisted on continuing that association. Whether the comparison is
strong depends in part on the nature of the privacy interest, if any,
that the Boy Scouts were seeking to protect. 71 Just as a walk across a
public sidewalk can involve strong privacy interests if the objective of
the walk is an intimate medical consultation, participation in a highly
public organization might well involve strong privacy interests
depending on the objectives pursued. Those objectives certainly
include character development and moral instruction for boys at a
highly sensitive stage of development. 72 Such objectives are pursued
through relationships with adults, including the personal example
they can provide. They are pursued in public settings but also in
highly personal settings that involve activities like camping and
individual conversations. That the members of the Boy Scouts
organization might feel-and might be entitled to feel-an acute
sense of unease in the presence of an unwanted, persistent participant
in this set of relationships is at least plausible.
I am not suggesting that Justice Stevens' reasoning in Hill required any particular result in Dale. But Stevens' failure to recognize73
even dimly the existence of parallel interests and issues is troubling.
Indeed, the benignly tolerant practicality that made Stevens' opinion
in Hill a potentially attractive reflection of wider cultural mores is
entirely missing in his dissent in Dale. In place of an empathetic
account of the Boy Scouts' associational interests, he characterizes
their decision as part of "the cancer of unlawful discrimination," and
he compares their unease with "atavistic opinions about certain racial
groups. '74 These condemnations are so severe and yet uttered with
such self-assurance that it is difficult to put them in perspective. It
might help to try to turn things around and imagine a judicial opinion
71. It might be thought that the Boy Scouts, as a national organization, cannot credibly
assert a privacy interest since personal communication and contact take place only at the local
level between individuals. This, however, means only that the organization is seeking to
construct and define certain private relationships among its members, not that privacy interests
are absent.
72. Id. at 649.
73. His dissent does include a discussion of cases involving the right to associate, but he
makes no effort to apply his thinking in Hill to those cases. See id. at 677-85. Indeed, under his
analysis of the right to associate, the question comes down to whether the inclusion of
homosexuals would "impose any serious burden" on the basic goals of the Boy Scouts. Id. at
683. Since his analysis of this issue focuses on the Boy Scouts' official statements, Stevens'
discussion of the right to associate turns into another discussion of their speech interests.
74. Id. at 699.
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that invalidated the Colorado bubble law on analogous grounds.
Suppose the Court were to assert that a patient who did not want to
hear the protestors' arguments was reflecting, not a sensibility that
(whether right or wrong) deserved to be understood and honored, but
an ugly prejudice against the scientific understanding that human life
begins at conception.
In short, while Stevens' dissent in Dale does, like many of his
other opinions, move away from doctrinalism toward a more accessible political discourse, it draws on a harshly judgmental and intolerant strain in American political life. More generally, his inattention
to the privacy interests implicated in the case suggests that in place of
the superficial rigor of doctrinalism, Stevens is proposing nothing
more than the ad hoc imposition of personal moral preferences.
E.

Santa Fe Independent School Districtv. Doe75

Although in a range of cases, then, Justice Stevens seems rather
unreceptive toward the interests of the unwilling listener, in at least
one decision besides Hill he firmly vindicated that interest in at least
one respect. In Santa Fe Independent School Districtv. Doe, issued at
almost the same time as Hill, he considered the position of a student
who, while attending a high school football game, did not want to
hear a fellow student read a prayer over the loudspeaker.16 Attending
a football game may not evoke all the intimate considerations that a
walk to a reproductive health center does, but Justice Stevens once
again is warmly empathetic. He notes that students "feel immense
social pressure.., to be involved in the extracurricular event that is
American high school football.... ,77 He asserts that students attending games will feel specific pressure to pray, and, indeed, that they
'78
will be "coerc[ed] ... to participate in an act of religious worship.
Even more ominously, school sponsorship of the student-led prayer
"sends the ancillary message to members of the audience who are
nonadherents 'that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community .... ,9
"'

75. 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
76. Id. at 294.
77. Id. at 311.
78. Id. at 312.
79. Id. at 309 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
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Apart from this highly sympathetic depiction of the interest of
the unwilling listener, Justice Stevens' opinion in Santa Fe is quite
different from his opinion in Hill both substantively and methodologically. In Hill, the abortion-specific history of the bubble law is
treated as irrelevant and, as I have said, Stevens defers to legislative
judgments about drafting and other matters. In Santa Fe, he goes to
considerable lengths to argue that the decision-making history behind
the school's apparently neutral policy demonstrates an illicit motive
to favor prayer; in fact, far from deferring to local authorities, Stevens
argues that the history of prayer endorsement imposes an obligation
on the authorities not merely to be neutral but to disassociate themselves from prayer.80 The result is a series of small but striking
inconsistencies. For example, in Hill, Stevens insisted on reading
words like "education" and "protests" abstractly, so that the bubble
law might have applied, he claimed, "to used car salesmen, animal
rights activists, fundraisers, environmentalists, and missionaries." 81 In
Santa Fe, Stevens insists on reading the word "solemnize" in the
historical context of the school's support for prayer, so that it implied
82
endorsement only of prayer.
More broadly, in Hill, the state is permitted to protect the interests of the unwilling listener under circumstances where protests can
certainly proceed. In Santa Fe, the state is required to protect the
interests of the unwilling listener under circumstances where any
message except a religious message can be broadcast over the loudspeaker. In short, in Santa Fe, the interest of the unwilling listener
justifies-requires-significant censorship.8 3 Indeed, students who
want to hear a religious message might be made into unwilling
listeners themselves, since they must endure whatever uplifting
secular message the school allows to be conveyed. The discomfort
created by this form of officially endorsed secularism might seem
relatively trivial," although it is not clear why it could not be as
80. Id. at 312-17.
81. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 723 (2000).
82. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 315.
83. A school district could respond to Santa Fe by allowing only secular messages or, if
concerned about the resulting discrimination against religious messages, it could prohibit all
messages.
84. There is, of course, no reason to assume that a religious student would have any specific
objection to the content of whatever secular messages end up being broadcast. Indeed, he
might approve of those messages, except in the sense that he would prefer a religious message
and resent hearing only secular communications. This resentment is, under Stevens' reasoning,
significant because it can make some members of the political community feel that their central
beliefs are banished, at least from public school programs.
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psychologically significant as the discomfort felt by someone objecting to public prayer. 85 Indeed, Stevens' own observations imply that
the religious student's discomfort at secularized messages could be

significant, since the wholesale exclusion of religious messages
ordered by the United States Supreme Court and implemented by
local authorities would surely cause some to feel "that they are
outsiders, not full members of the political community .... 86 Even

when Stevens' concern for the unwilling listener reemerges, then, it
reemerges selectively. The conclusion seems inescapable that Ste-

vens' moral imagination-not to mention the details of his analysisis shaped and limited by an explicitly stated fear of sectarian conflict.
In this Justice Stevens claims to be drawing on the lessons of American constitutional history, but he may also be drawing on -and giving

voice to-the dark fears and suppressive urges that lie very near the
surface of modern political life. 87
CONCLUSION

Justice Stevens' somewhat promising opinion in Hill turns out
not to signal the development of an attractive alternative to formulaic
free speech law. Looking at other opinions where analogous interests
are involved, we find that his moral sensibilities lack imaginative

breadth and consequently appear parochial if not narrowly ideological. His empathetic exploration of the interests of the unwilling
listener at times is reduced to a rather chilly and formal acknowledgment, and at times to complete nonrecognition. We find that he relies

uncritically on conventional doctrines and assumptions some of the
time, that his respect for political decision making comes and goes,
85. I recognize that it is possible to take the position that offense generated by public
prayer is not comparable to offense created by other types of messages because the Constitution
specifically prohibits government endorsement of religion. Whether or not this distinction is
available to others, it is not available to Justice Stevens because, as his opinion in Hill demonstrates, he believes that the unwilling listener's right "to be let alone" is important; indeed, "the
right most valued by civilized men." 530 U.S.at 716-17.
86. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 309 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring)).
87. That is to say, Stevens appears to be hostile to religious belief. If the opinion in Santa
Fe is not a sufficient indication, it should be noted that in considering the constitutionality of a
voucher system, Justice Stevens refers four times in his very brief dissenting opinion to
education within religious schools as "indoctrination." Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S.
639, 684-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (2002); see also, Michael Stokes Paulsen, Scouts, Families,
and Schools, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1917, 1917 (2001) (referring to Stevens' dissent in Boy Scouts as
"stunningly bigoted.., one of the most intolerant-of-religion opinions ever to appear in the
U.S. Reports.").
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and that, in short, his intellectual daring is erratic and apparently
strategic. Perhaps most disappointing is Stevens' failure to extend the
effort, which is visible in Hill, to draw on the strain of generous and
tolerant pragmatism in American political life. Instead of expanding
on the effort to allow the political system to find evenhanded and
respectful ways to accommodate bitterly divided groups, in important
instances Stevens himself imposes a form of severe and suppressive
judgmentalism.
In a broader sense, these failures call to mind some of the more
extreme critiques of public discourse in modern America. Justice
Stevens' blatant inconsistencies, both with respect to specific positions and to his more general stance on doctrinalism, seem to reflect
the opportunistic, manipulative strain so prevalent among interest
groups and politicians. His shifting sensibility on the nature and
importance of privacy interests suggests the melodramatic, highly
personalized moralism that dominates popular culture and influences
political debate as well. His outbursts of self-righteousness are of a
piece with the angry intolerance that drives the culture wars from
both sides. In short, although Justice Stevens appears to be moving
towards a constitutional discourse that is more directly grounded in
the general political culture, he does not appear to be elevating the
resources available in that culture.
It is too much to say that the opinions discussed here are so thin
and unappealing as to justify the conclusion that Justice Stevens'
project is especially dangerous. Even accepting the worst characterization of his emerging jurisprudence-that it amounts to the overconfident imposition of highly debatable personal preferences-I myself
am not at all sure that would be clearly worse than the alternatives.
Much the same can be said and has been said of other, more conventional forms of constitutional interpretations. In my view, the ambitious pursuit of progress through the heavy hand of formalism or
through the deceptiveness of doctrinal rigor is also dangerous.
Stevens' opinions at least have the advantage of relative transparency.
Being more direct and less arcane, they display some of what is
admirable, as well as some of what is regrettable, about our culture's
moral and rhetorical resources. The problem may lie, not so much in
the quality of those resources or in Justice Stevens' relatively unvarnished use of them, but in the underlying endeavor itself. Even
discursive resources more deeply grounded and persuasive than ours
might not be adequate to justify the imposition of a particular moral

530
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vision on a people who are both deeply divided and fully entitled to
be deeply divided. Or, to turn back to the relatively attractive aspects
of the opinion in Hill, the moral vocabulary available today-with all
its limitations-might be adequate, but only if used by the Court to
explain how Americans, operating through accountable institutions,
are free to work out decent accommodations for even their most
bitter disputes.

